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U.S. Geological Survey Manual


1. General.

A. Planning for security should be an integral part of any function or project undertaken within the USGS. The most efficient and cost-effective method of instituting security measures into any facility or operation is through advance planning and continuous monitoring throughout the project or program. Selecting, constructing, or modifying a facility without considering the security implications of employee safety and assets protection can result in costly modifications and lost time.

B. Physical security programs shall be administered within each region, center, and field activity based on the policy in SM 440.2 and the guidance set forth in this handbook, to ensure the protection of USGS assets. These programs should be continually and effectively administered by the appropriate organizational security officer and monitored to ensure their integrity. At a minimum, a physical security program should include:

(1) A physical security survey (see Appendix C) of each facility occupied by USGS to determine the security level of the facility and to determine the minimum-security safeguards required as cited in Appendix B, Department of the Interior Facility Security Standards, for protecting USGS personnel and assets;

(2) An initial physical security survey prior to constructing, leasing, acquiring, modifying, or occupying a facility or area to determine the minimum-security safeguards required to protect USGS personnel and assets. A follow-up physical security survey must be done before acceptance of the property or occupancy to ensure the completion of required modifications and security upgrades;

(3) Periodic reassessments of facilities to ascertain whether a security program meets pertinent Federal and departmental standards or regulations;

(4) A comprehensive and continuing awareness and education effort to gain the interest and support of employees, contractors, consultants, and visitors; and

(5) Procedures for taking immediate, positive, and orderly action to safeguard life and property during an emergency.

C. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, and the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, as amended, require Federal agencies to ensure accessibility and safety for employees, applicants, and members of the public with disabilities who are in USGS facilities. The bureau will ensure that accessibility and safety issues regarding people with disabilities are addressed in all relevant aspects of the establishment of appropriate physical security measures to protect personnel, real and personal property, and information. A key element to the success of this will be ensuring that security and facility officials are familiar with the legal requirements to meet the needs of people with disabilities while also maintaining physical security.

2. Facility Protection.

A. The extent of facility protection is determined by the senior official or manager of the activity based on the results of a comprehensive physical security survey of the facility ( Appendix C).

(1) Perimeter protection is the first line of defense in providing physical security for personnel, property, and information at a facility.

(2) The second line of defense is interior controls. The extent of interior controls will be determined by considering the monetary value and criticality of the items and areas to be protected, the vulnerability of the facility, and the cost of the controls necessary to reduce that vulnerability.

(3) The cost of security controls normally should not exceed the monetary value of the item or areas to be protected, unless necessitated by criticality or national security.

3. Planning Facility Protection.

A. The objective of planning facility protection is to ensure both the integrity of operations and the security of assets. Planning for security must be an integral part of selecting, constructing, reconfiguring, or moving into a USGS facility.

B. The modification of a facility or addition of security measures after occupying a facility can be costly and impractical. Therefore, the responsible security officer and the facility management personnel need to coordinate closely, from the outset, on any addition, alteration, or new construction. The coordination should begin with the designers and architects and continue through the contracting process and actual construction and installation.

C. Many USGS offices occupy space in Federal buildings or in commercial buildings where GSA executes the lease on behalf of the Government. In leased office space, physical security may not be as easily controlled or be controlled to the same extent as in a facility where the Government owns the facility. The USGS tenants must rely on GSA to provide protection for the building, and it is therefore imperative that the security officer of the activity establishes a working relationship with the appropriate GSA officials or FSO to maintain an active role in the security decisions and processes that will affect the facility.

4. Facility Protection in USGS Owned or Leased Facilities. For buildings or grounds owned or leased by the USGS to include leased space from other Federal agencies, the senior official having jurisdiction of the real property is responsible for determining the degree of protection to be provided the space. The level of protection shall be based on a physical security survey of each facility conducted by the FSO using the guidelines and requirements cited in this handbook to evaluate the security of that facility on a case-by-case basis considering the facility’s location, size and configuration, number of occupants, mission, extent of exterior lighting, presence of physical barriers, and other factors as may be deemed pertinent. (See Conducting Surveys, Paragraph 8A (5) below.)

5. Facility Protection in GSA Owned or Leased Facilities. For building and grounds for which GSA has space assignment responsibility, GSA is responsible for furnishing normal protection not less than the degree of protection provided by commercial building operators of similar space for normal risk occupants, as determined by a Federal Protective Service (FPS) physical security survey. (See Appendix D for a list of FPS regional law enforcement offices, addresses, and telephone numbers.) This protection may include guards, access control, intrusion detection (alarms), closed circuit television surveillance (CCTV), inspection of packages, etc., when the FPS survey determines the control is warranted for general Government occupancy and not necessitated by special activities or specific agencies. Special protection required due to the nature of the business conducted within the space or unusual public reaction to an agency's program and missions, whether or not of a continuing nature, is determined jointly by the FPS and the occupant agency or agencies and is provided on a reimbursable basis.

A. Protection Criteria. The FPS determines the level of normal protective service on a case-by-case basis and normally considers the facility's location, size and configuration, the occupant agency’s mission, history of criminal or disruptive incidents in the surrounding neighborhood, extent of exterior lighting, presence of physical barriers, and other factors as may be deemed pertinent.

B. Physical Protection. GSA provides normal and special protection through mobile patrol or fixed posts manned by FPS officers or contract uniformed personnel, security systems and devices, locking building entrances and gates during other than normal hours of occupancy, cooperation of local law enforcement agencies, or any combination thereof depending upon the facility and the degree of risk involved. The degree of normal and special protection is determined by completion of a FPS physical security survey and/or crime prevention assessment.

C. Crime prevention. The FPS collects and disseminates information about criminal activity on or against property under the charge and control of GSA, provides crime prevention information programs to occupant and agencies upon request, and conducts crime prevention assessments in cooperation with occupant agencies.

6. Facility Protection in Facilities with GSA Delegations of Authority. In facilities where GSA has delegated protection authority to the agency or prime tenant, some of the protection responsibilities are transferred to the agency, including procurement, installation, maintenance of physical security equipment and systems, and procurement and management of any guard contracts. Normally, FPS will retain responsibility for physical security surveys, mobile patrols, monitoring of alarms, response to incidents, and requests for criminal investigations. FPS will provide such services at no charge to the agency beyond the protection portion of the rent.

7. Design Factors. It is imperative that security systems and procedures are considered from the design phase on, so that conduit runs and alarm wiring, heavy-duty materials, reinforcing devices and other necessary construction requirements are provided in the original plans.

A. Facility and Building Location.

(1) Determine the minimum-security safeguards as delineated by Appendix B, Department of the Interior (DOI) Facility Security Standards, and incorporate them in your facility planning. Start by determining the security level of the facility as determined by the DOI Facility Security Standards, whether it is open to the public (See Chapter 8, paragraph 4A(2)), and the time it will take for enforcement response to incidents.

(2) Check geographical factors carefully. Avoid locating facilities near high crime, high traffic, or industrial areas. Take into account approach routes, traffic patterns, and nearby transportation.

(3) At a facility site, the number of separate buildings should be kept to a minimum, and they should be grouped close together.

B. Configuration of Space.

(1) Entrances. Facility or office entrances should be kept to a minimum commensurate with fire safety, to control access or prevent crime. Although convenience of employee access, parking, and deliveries must be considered, one entrance with multiple interior routes is preferable to several outside entrances. Entrances should be planned with guard posts and access control systems and procedures in mind. Reception desks, barriers, and other controls should be planned from the start. Accessibility of entrances for individuals with disabilities must also be considered and planned from the start.

(2) Access Controls. Plan for locking devices or controls at perimeter and interior doors. Provide for effective key control. Plan for protective, cleaning, and maintenance forces, and determine hours, locations, and levels of access for such personnel.

(3) Location of Offices and Facilities. Locate offices or other facilities in close proximity and on the same or successive floors. Try to locate sensitive operations such as credit unions or imprest funds on upper or lower floors and away from entrances.

C. Safety and Fire Protection. Safety and fire protection requirements must be incorporated in any construction plans. With proper coordination, safety requirements can be achieved. Contact the Regional Safety Manager regarding National Fire Prevention Administration (NFPA) and local code requirements and construction standards.

D. Utilities. Utility systems should be protected against unauthorized access. Plan for protection of telephone and electrical closets and conduit runs, heating and cooling systems, water supplies, and boilers and generators.

E. Special Activities. Special emphasis should be placed on security systems and safeguards when constructing or modifying special or sensitive activities such as imprest funds, computer facilities, equipment storage or shipping and receiving areas, classified work areas and mailrooms, and special-use areas such as warehouses or hazardous material storage areas. (See Chapter 10.)

F. Contingency Plans. A contingency plan must be developed for each USGS facility and GSA-delegated facility to protect personnel and property in the event of emergencies such as fire; bomb threats; civil disturbances; natural disasters; and chemical, biological, or radiological events. The Designated Official (as defined in FPMR 101-20.003) is responsible for developing, implementing, and maintaining an Occupant Emergency Plan. (See Paragraph 11 below.)

8. Surveys and Inspections. A physical security survey (Appendix C) is an in-depth analysis to determine the extent of security measures, which will be needed for protecting USGS personnel, property, and information. An inspection is a check or test against a certain set of standards or regulations to ascertain whether a security program or facility meets those standards or regulations. It is used to evaluate the implementation of regulations, the security awareness of employees, security administration, and existing internal management controls. It should be used as a tool by the security officer to carry out his/her oversight responsibilities.

A. Surveys.

(1) Purpose. The survey will be used by the senior facility manager to determine the type and extent of security controls for the facility or areas. Each type of physical security survey will include the determination of the security level of the facility and a security evaluation (threat assessment), which addresses the criticality of operations, the vulnerability of the facility or area, and the probability of compromise of the personnel or property contained therein. Appendix B, DOI Facility Security Standards provides the criteria for determining what security level a facility is of the possible four (4) security levels. The DOI security standards also provide a chart delineating the recommended minimum-security standards applicable to each of the four security levels addressing facility criticality, vulnerabilities, and risk of security penetrations. In those cases where the FPS does not provide a physical security survey, the FSO or a facility manager should conduct a survey of the facility.

(2) Recommendations. The FSO should work with the facility or office manager in developing a security plan for resolving any recommendations resulting from the surveys and inspections.

(3) Criticality, Vulnerability, and Probability/Risk. No survey is considered complete until all three of the factors below have been given full consideration and weight.

(a) Criticality. Criticality is the effect that partial or total loss of the facility or area would have on the national security or the Department's, USGS's, regions’, or the facility's mission. The adversity of the effect is directly related to the criticality factor. Examples of adverse effects include the interruption of a vital function, disruption of the continuity of operations, or the compromise of national security information. A higher classification level of information handled or stored in a facility or area will increase the criticality.

(b) Vulnerability. Vulnerability of the facility or area is the susceptibility of a facility or area to damage or destruction or the possible theft or loss of property. Factors used to determine vulnerability include the size, configuration, and location of the facility or area, the local crime rate, and the proximity of law enforcement, and emergency response services.

(c) Probability/Risk. Probability deals with an assessment of the chances or risk that certain events could or might occur, such as a penetration of the perimeter, compromise of a system, or the occurrence of a variety of unauthorized activities.

(4) Type of Surveys.

(a) Initial Survey. The initial physical security survey (See Appendix C) is conducted prior to constructing, leasing, acquiring, modifying, or occupying a facility or area. It describes any modification required to raise the level of security commensurate with the levels of criticality and vulnerability. At a minimum, the initial survey must address the minimum-security requirements delineated in the DOI Facilities Security Standards (See Appendix B).

(b) Follow-up Survey. When recommendations are made in the initial physical security survey, a follow-up survey is conducted to ensure the completion of modifications. This survey should be conducted before acceptance of the property or occupancy.

(c) Supplemental Survey. The supplemental survey is conducted when changes in the organization, mission, facility, or the threat level of the facility alter or affect the security posture of the facility or area. This survey is conducted at the discretion of either the facility manager or the FSO. The Bureau Security Manager may require that facilities undergo a supplemental survey when there is a change of the overall threat level to all Survey facilities, such as the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001.

(d) Special Survey. The special survey is conducted to examine or resolve a specific issue, such as when there is a request for a Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) accredited facility or there is a need to investigate or assess damage resulting from an incident.

(5) Conducting Surveys. Normally for GSA owned, leased, and delegated facilities, surveys will be conducted by the FPS, and it will not be necessary for the security officer of the facility to conduct a physical security survey. For USGS owned and leased facilities to include leased space from other Federal agencies, the FSO of the facility must conduct the physical security survey (See Appendix C). When necessary, the FSO conducting a survey should start by obtaining a layout of the facility, which depicts areas within the facility, access points, parking lots, warehouses, and any adjacent areas belonging to the facility. The FSO should interview program management officials to determine the mission and nature of operations, classification or sensitivity level of information, and value of assets. The FSO should also obtain the following:

(a) The facility's address, number of buildings and square footage, tenant organizations, approximate population, and names of key management officials;

(b) A description of features of the facility and conditions that produce vulnerabilities. Document the physical configuration of the office or facility for classified information storage areas;

(c) The law enforcement agency, fire department, and other organizations responsible for emergency response. Include the guard force company or agency, and its response time;

(d) Type of construction of buildings at the facility;

(e) The determined value of monies or sensitive or unique equipment, the highest classification level of information, or the number and types of weapons;

(f) Description of access controls, alarms, guard services, and security containers; and

(g) Recommendations for improving security and pertinent implementing instructions, which include the required minimum-security standards as delineated by the DOI Facility Security Standards (See Appendix B).

(6) Survey Report. Survey reports produced by the FPS are provided to the Designated Official. When conducted by the FSO, a written survey report should be generated that is thorough and precise. It should contain supporting exhibits such as floor plans and specifications. The FSO’s survey report should be submitted to the facility or office manager for review, and a copy should be maintained by the FSO.

B. Inspections.

(1) Purpose. Inspections, which may be announced or unannounced, are usually conducted to determine the extent of compliance with security regulations or procedures, including those recommended during surveys. The security officer shall inspect facilities and programs under the security officer's cognizance as often as necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of the applicable SM chapter. The inspections should result in written inspection reports.

(2) Checklists.

(a) Appendix C, Physical Security Survey Checklist, can be used by a security officer to inspect the physical security of a facility.

(b) SM 440.3.l3B requires each Top Secret Control Officer, Classified Document Custodian, and Special Security Officer to conduct a self-inspection program for the evaluation of all security procedures applicable to their operation for the protection of national security information. In order to assist the self-inspector in assessing the security posture of his/her national security information facility, a Security Inspection Check List is contained as Appendix B to the National Security Information Handbook (440-3-H).

(3) Recommendations. The security officer should assist the facility or office manager in resolving any discrepancies or implementing any recommendations.

(4) Types of Inspections.

(a) Evaluation. The evaluative or fact-finding inspection is generally positive in tone and promotes liaison and security awareness while taking a broad, general look at a facility or program. Deficiencies, which may be resolved either on the spot or within a non-specified time frame, may be noted and recommendations for further corrective actions may be made. The evaluative inspection can also help management officials in planning or upgrading their security programs.

(b) Compliance. The full compliance inspection generally is conducted for enforcement purposes. It focuses on compliance with established standards or regulations.

(c) Follow-up. Another form of compliance inspection is the follow-up inspection, conducted to ensure that facility officials have complied with recommendations from earlier inspections.

(d) After-hours Room Check. The after-hours room check is a form of compliance inspection. It monitors compliance with security regulations, especially involving areas where national security information is processed or stored.

(e) Self-inspection. The self-inspection is initiated by the security officer or facility manager to evaluate his/her own security program. Additionally, self-inspections are required by each Top Secret Control Officer, Classified Document Custodian, and Special Security Officer to evaluate all security procedures applicable to their operation using the self-inspection checklist contained in Appendix B of the National Security Information Handbook (440-3-H). The scope and purpose of the self-inspection for an office, building, or other facility is determined by the initiator.

(f) Closeout. A closeout self-inspection is accomplished immediately prior to the action to administratively terminate an authorized Top Secret Control Station, Classified Control Station, or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). During closeout inspections, all areas and containers authorized for the storage of classified material are checked to ensure all classified material has been removed.

(5) Frequency of Inspections. The frequency of inspections will be based on the criticality and vulnerability of the facility or the level of classification or value of information handled or stored at a facility. Following are the established standards:

(a) Each Top Secret Control Officer, Classified Document Custodian, and Special Security Officer is required to conduct an annual self-inspection program utilizing the Security Inspection Check List in Appendix B of the National Security Information Handbook (440-3-H).

(b) The Regional Security Officer coordinates a schedule of periodic inspections of Top Secret Control Stations, Classified Control Stations, and Foreign Intelligence Registries. A review of the completed annual self-inspection checklist serves as the basis for these inspections. The USGS Security Manager coordinates a schedule of periodic inspections of the Regional Security Officers and their security program.

(c) In conjunction with periodic field assistance visits, the USGS Security Manager or designee conducts inspections of weapon storage facilities and the accountability and control of Departmental and USGS identification cards, badges, and smart cards.

(6) Conducting Inspections.

(a) Plan an inspection by determining the scope, type, and method. Schedule the inspection, and if appropriate, provide written notice. The notice should provide the date(s), purpose, proposed interview schedule, and request for any information needed by the security officer. Review past inspection reports and prepare a list of questions or a checklist to structure the inspection.

(b) Upon arrival at the site and prior to departure, the inspector should meet with the senior manager to discuss the inspection. Collect a sufficient sampling of data from interviews with on-site employees and contractors and from touring the facility. Obtain information to support findings in the inspection report. Report favorable findings as well as deficiencies. Check awareness and adherence to local security procedures. Document any discrepancies corrected on the spot.

(c) After sufficient data is collected, the inspector should analyze all findings, compare them with applicable security regulations, list discrepancies and cite regulatory references, recommend corrective action, and write the inspection report.

(d) The inspection report should be produced within 10 working days of completion of the inspection. The report should be distributed to the office, facility, or regional manager in a timely manner and require a response to any recommendations. Copies of final inspection reports shall be provided to the Security Management Office.

9. Awareness and Education. A security program is most effective when employees practice security daily. That sort of interest and support can be gained through an effective security awareness and education program that encompasses all aspects of security. The security officer is responsible for carrying out and administering a comprehensive, on-going security awareness and education program for all employees in his/her respective activity.

A. Awareness and Educations Plans. The security officer must plan an effective program of instruction and efficient use of training material provided for specific training purposes. The security officer may also tailor presentations to the organization and solicit other security professionals to speak on their areas of responsibility, training, and experience. For example, a local police representative could address crime prevention. Also, the FPS offers posters and pamphlets with helpful security hints and will provide on-site crime-prevention seminars. (See Appendix D for a list of FPS regional law enforcement offices, addresses, and telephone numbers.)

B. Briefings.

(1) Initial Orientation Briefings.

(a) Simply providing printed security regulations is not an effective way to promote complete understanding of security responsibilities. A verbal orientation briefing, preferably supplemented with audio-visuals and handouts, is more effective. Where possible, it should be presented personally. Where this is not practical, it may be presented in the form of a videotape or other recording.

(b) The initial orientation, whether written or verbal, should address general physical security principles, including common security hazards, building security and crime prevention, key system or other site-specific access controls, vehicle control, and property accountability or package inspection programs. It should also address SM 440.3 implementation of Departmental and Federal regulations relating to the handling and safeguarding of national security information, including reporting requirements and nondisclosure provisions.

(2) Special Briefings. Specialized briefings should be made available for employees with national security duties or special accesses that entail special handling, reporting or safeguarding requirements.

(a) National Security Briefings. These are information security briefings that apply to individuals who handle classified information. The briefings focus on classifications, markings, transmission, disclosure, safeguarding, and destruction of information. The national security briefing and a signed Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (SF 312) is required prior to issuance of a national security information clearance certification. Specific guidance for conducting initial, refresher, or termination briefings is provided in Chapter 13, National Security Information Handbook (440-3-H). Also, to assist security officers in accomplishing these briefings, separate videotape presentations entitled "Information Security Briefing" and "Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement Briefing" have been distributed to security officers with USGS national security programs. Additional copies are available from the USGS Security Manager.

(b) Special Access Briefings. These are briefings related to the various special access programs such as those administered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Department of Energy (DOE), and Department of Defense (DOD).

(c) Crime Prevention. A well-rounded security awareness and education program includes information on crime prevention. Encourage employees to remove or minimize opportunities for crime by knowing the signs of unauthorized activity; by practicing good office security; and reporting unauthorized activity, security deficiencies, violations, and safety hazards.

10. Incident Reporting. An incident reporting program is an essential element in any security program. The timely reporting of thefts, losses, or damage of property and the tampering or unauthorized disclosure of information is important. A timely report increases the possibility of recovering the property, minimizing damage, and apprehending the perpetuator. Any employee who discovers, witnesses, or has knowledge of a criminal, dangerous, or unauthorized practice or condition, or a violation of security regulations shall immediately report the matter to the appropriate authorities.

A. Reporting Serious Incidents, Unusual Events, and Emergency Conditions. The senior official at a facility is responsible for reporting serious incidents, unusual events, or emergency conditions that affect USGS operations to his/her Regional Director for their appropriate action.

(1) Security Management Office. The Regional Director or his/her designee must report the following information to the USGS Security Management Office for further reporting to the DOI Watch Office:

(a) Homeland Security and Facility Infrastructure Protection.

• Threats, attempted sabotage or terrorist activity directed against DOI facilities.
• Threats, attempted sabotage or terrorist activity directed against mineral, oil, natural gas or electrical grid on DOI lands or regulated by DOI.
• Information regarding threatened or actual demonstrations that may impact upon mission-essential facilities, critical infrastructure, or national monuments.
• Intelligence information regarding threats to DOI facilities coming from other than Departmental channels.
• Threats or damage from natural disasters or technological emergencies impacting mission-essential facilities or critical infrastructure.
• Suspicious loss or theft of government vehicles, law enforcement equipment or credentials.

(b) Other.

• Incidents resulting in property damage exceeding $100,000.
• Incidents with potential to result in media interest.
• Serious incidents involving DOI employees on official duty outside the U.S., including incidents attracting media or diplomatic attention.
• Other incidents that warrant attention by the Office of the Secretary.

(2) USGS Emergency Coordinator. The Regional Director or his/her designee must report the following information to the USGS Emergency Coordinator for further reporting to the DOI Watch Office:

(a) Deaths, Injuries, and Accidents.

• Fatalities on DOI lands or properties, excluding natural causes.
• Employee fatalities, while on duty.
• Life-threatening injury to employee, while in performance of their duties.
• Serious injury to multiple employees or visitors.
• Serious incident involving Federal, state or foreign government officials on DOI lands.
• Aircraft accidents on DOI lands.
• Accidents involving aircraft owned, operated or under contract by DOI (also reported in accordance with 352 DM 6.)

(b) Disaster and Emergency Incidents Response.

• Natural disasters affecting DOI lands or facilities that cause injury, significant damage, impact visitor use, or degrade the ability to provide vital services.
• Serious incidents such as major structural fires, structural failures, or other emergency events affecting DOI lands or facilities that cause injury, significant damage, impact visitor use, or degrade the ability to provide vital services.
• Warnings of natural disasters or other serious emergencies that threaten DOI lands, facilities or infrastructure, and preparedness measures taken in response to such threats.
• Information on events monitored by Departmental of Homeland Security or the Watch Office that may impact DOI lands or adjacent areas.
• Emergency preparedness and response activities involving tribes and insular areas.
• Warnings, alerts or advisories related to emergency conditions issued to the public by DOI bureaus and offices, including dam failures, flood, earthquake and volcanoes.
• Requests for or actual deployment of DOI employees, resources or technical assistance to support emergency activities of other departments or agencies.
• Major search and rescue activities involving large numbers of personnel or coordination of interagency resources.

(c) Wildland Fires.

• Fires on DOI lands. Reported to National Interagency Fire Center. (Bureaus shall alert the Watch Office to major incidents, which cause injury, significant damage, or impact visitor use.)
• Use of DOI Wildfire resources. (Bureaus shall report actual or planned deployment of significant DOI resources for non-fire emergency activities.)

(d) Environmental Incidents. Incidents on or potentially impacting DOI lands. Incidents are reported to the National Response Center, 800-424-8802; the regional environmental officer; and the DOI Watch Office.

B. Reporting Incidents to Law Enforcement Agencies.

(1) Interior Property Management Regulation 114-60.810-2 requires that cases of theft, unauthorized use, or vandalism of Government property be reported to the local or State law enforcement authority and to facility security forces where appropriate. (See Chapter 9 for an explanation of law enforcement jurisdiction and pertinent Federal, state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies.) Additionally, all thefts and vandalism of Government property must be reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI will conduct an active investigation only in cases where the value of the property stolen or missing is $5,000 or more. Reports for items valued at less than $5,000 will be placed in the FBI administrative files for analysis but normally no investigation will be conducted.

(2) FPMR 101-20.103-3 requires the prompt reporting of all crimes and suspicious circumstances occurring on GSA-controlled property to the regional FPS Law Enforcement Branch (See Appendix D). In most cases, the FPS will dispatch a U.S. Special Police Officer to record the incident. The GSA Form 3155, Offense/Incident Report, is the standard reporting form. This form may be used by the security officer in reporting the incident when FPS police officers are not available in the general area. The form requests information such as date; time and location of incident; details regarding lost, stolen, or damaged items; nature of the incident; and any suspects involved. Supplies of the form can be obtained from the FPS Regional Office (See Appendix D) or GSA building manager.

C. Administrative Reporting. The incident reporting requirements stated herein are not a substitute for nor do they eliminate the need for compliance with any additional reporting requirements prescribed in Federal and Departmental Regulations and in the USGS SM pertaining to motor vehicle incidents and to the loss, damage, and mishandling of Government property.

11. Emergency Planning and Evacuation.

A. Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP). In accordance with FPMR 101-20.103-4, "Occupant Emergency Program," immediate, positive, and orderly action must be taken to safeguard life and property in Federal facilities during emergencies. Examples of emergency situations are bomb threats; civil disorders; fires; explosions; chemical, biological, or radiological events; natural disasters; direct threat to a major computer facility; and immediate threat of compromise of classified information. This FPMR requires the development of an emergency evacuation plan for each Federal facility. Each security officer should cooperate with and assist the Designated Official or safety personnel responsible for developing the OEP.

(1) In GSA-controlled facilities, emergency procedures are normally provided by the GSA Building Manager or local officials of the FPS.

(2) In USGS-owned facilities, the senior facility manager shall coordinate the development of the OEP in consultation with the servicing safety officer and building management officials.

B. Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). Presidential Homeland Security Directive 3 established the HSAS. There are two major elements of that system: establishing protective measures for each of the five Threat Conditions and a system for disseminating information about threats. The five Threat Conditions are as follows: 1) green, which is issued when there is a low risk of terrorist attack; 2) blue, which is issued when there is a general risk of terrorist attacks; 3) yellow, which is issued when there is a significant risk of terrorist attack; 4) orange, which is issued when there is a high risk of terrorist attack; and 5) red, which is issued when there is a severe risk of terrorist attack or when intelligence indicates that terrorist action against a specific target is imminent.

(1) GSA Managed Space. In space owned or managed by the GSA, USGS offices and facilities will rely on GSA-issued guidance and protective measures to implement the HSAS. (Contact your nearest FPS office at one of the regional addresses cited in Appendix D for GSA-issued guidance and protective measures.) Guidance issued by FPS will be the minimum measures to be taken at each Threat Condition. Principal managers or FSO’s may develop additional measures, as they deem appropriate. Principal managers or FSO’s are responsible for establishing a notification system to ensure that appropriate personnel are notified of changes in protective measures and of threat information affecting the office/facility. Additionally, the principal manager or FSO is also responsible for developing means of informing employees about their responsibilities under different threat levels and protective measures.

(2) USGS Owned or Leased Space. For USGS owned or leased space to include leased space from other Federal agencies, Survey Manual 440.5, Threat Condition Guidance, implements the protective measures required for each of the five Threat Conditions established by the HSAS based on the security level of the facility (See Appendix B to determine security level of a facility). When a Threat Condition is announced by Homeland Security, the Security Management Office will notify Regional Security Officers who are responsible for notifying the principal building manager or the FSO of each USGS owned or leased facility. Principal managers or FSO’s are responsible for establishing a notification system to ensure that appropriate personnel are notified of changes in protective measures and of threat information affecting the office/facility. Additionally, the principal manager or FSO is also responsible for developing means of informing employees about their responsibilities under different threat levels and protective measures.

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U.S. Department of the Interior
, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, VA, USA
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